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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As corporations have increased in size and complexity, so have the 
demands on their operations, requiring more complex organizational 
structures, such as departments and divisions, a more diverse workforce 
possessing various levels and areas of expertise, and a more formalized 
accountability system that provides, for example, for formal disclosure 
reports and the hiring of independent auditors.  The demands on 
corporate boards of directors have also changed.  These demands require 
boards to perform a multitude of functions that call for attention to the 
structure of boards and to their composition and practices.  Insufficient 
changes have been made, however, to accommodate these multiple roles 
of corporate boards. 
This Article discusses the multiple roles of corporate boards, including 
the manager-monitoring, relational, and strategic management roles.  
The main focus for legal reform of corporate boards has been on the 
manager-monitoring role, which is commonly called the supervisory 
role.  To better perform this function, corporations have made a number 
of changes in the structure, composition, and practices of their boards.  
For instance, corporations have changed their boards’ structure by 
creating specialized board committees.  They have also given attention 
to the composition of their boards to ensure the necessary expertise for 
these committees and the independence of board members from 
management.  In addition, boards are increasingly adopting the practice 
of requiring outside directors to meet separately from executive officers 
in certain situations.  The second role of boards, the relational role, is 
less well understood.  The relational role refers to the use of board 
memberships to facilitate the sharing of information and perspectives 
among corporations and their various stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
consumers, and the legal and financial community, and to ensure the 
corporations of the continued support of these stakeholders.  
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Traditionally, approximately twenty-six percent of board members have 
been selected to perform relational functions.1  In recent years, the 
interest of the business community in forming more diverse boards 
illustrates the continued importance of the relational role of boards.  
Diversity in terms of the presence of women, minority, and foreign 
directors on boards is intended to enable corporations to better relate to 
their domestic and foreign consumers and employees.  The third role of 
boards, the strategic role, is generally subsumed within the manager-
monitoring and relational roles.  A separate strategic role of boards is 
indicated, however, to the extent that boards engage in strategic 
management, which refers to the development and implementation of 
corporate strategy at the board level.  This Article explains how these 
roles more accurately describe board functions than the description of 
board functions as control, service, and strategy.  
The multiple roles of boards often come into conflict with each other.  
The relational role of boards can conflict with the manager-monitoring 
role when board members selected to perform relational functions have 
business relationships with the corporation and therefore are not 
independent of management, as is desirable for manager monitoring.  
Similarly, the emergence of a strategic management role for boards, to 
the extent that it is occurring, is not necessarily a positive development 
because the performance of this role may detract from the time boards 
spend on manager monitoring.  Also, if insiders are best at this strategic 
management function, this may dictate a more insider (executive 
officer)-dominated board at the expense of independent directors who 
are advisable for effective manager monitoring. 
A recent meta-analysis has found that both insider-dominated and 
outsider-dominated boards are associated with more successful 
corporations in terms of return on assets.2  This Article explores a 
number of alternative explanations for these findings.  It proposes an 
interpretation based on the perception that boards perform multiple roles.  
Insider-dominated boards perform some roles more effectively than 
outsider-dominated boards, particularly strategic management.  Outsider-
 
 1. Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board 
of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 101, 113 (1985). 
 2. See generally John A. Wagner III et al., Board Composition and Organizational 
Performance: Two Studies of Insider/Outsider Effects, 35 J. MGMT. STUD. 655 (1998) 
(presenting two studies that examine the association between the inside/outside director 
composition of boards and organization performance). 
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dominated boards perform other functions better than insider-dominated 
boards, particularly manager-monitoring functions, to the extent that the 
outside directors are truly independent of management—unlike many 
outside directors of Enron Corporation prior to its collapse.3  Both 
boards perform relational and some monitoring functions.  This analysis 
suggests a number of corporate board reforms that will enable boards to 
perform their multiple functions more effectively. 
The findings of the meta-analysis suggest that the potential exists for 
enhancing board performance by the use of a dual board structure.  This 
structure would consist of (1) an insider-dominated board, composed of 
insiders and outside (relational) board members who would not 
necessarily be independent of management—a “business review” board, 
and (2) an outsider-dominated board, composed solely of independent 
directors—a “conflicts” board.4  First, a conflicts board is designed to 
decrease the pressures that inside directors place on independent 
directors to conform to management wishes in areas where management 
has conflicts of interest.  The organization of a conflicts board is a 
logical step in the process of board reform, which began with increasing 
the number of outside directors on corporate boards and their committees, 
and has extended more recently to having outside directors meet 
separately from the full board.  The formation of a conflicts board takes 
the social dynamics of groups seriously and insists on the independence 
of outside directors.  A related proposal, although one also applicable to 
single board systems, is one in which independent directors appoint a 
corporate ombudsperson who would have access to all corporate 
meetings and information concerning the corporation.5  The corporate 
ombudsperson would serve the independent directors full-time for a 
three-year period and would report to both independent directors and 
shareholders in the corporation’s annual report.  Improving the flow of 
 
 3. See infra note 61.  Prior to Enron’s collapse, it was listed as the seventh largest 
publicly traded company in the United States, with over $100 billion in gross revenues.  
Enron was widely admired for its transformation of an old-line energy company into a 
high tech global company.  It filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.  As a result of 
its aggressive accounting and off-book activities, its assets had to be written down by as 
much as $24 billion.  Its stock plummeted from ninety dollars per share in August 2000 
to forty cents per share in December 2001.  Many Enron employees lost their jobs and 
significant retirement savings that were heavily invested in Enron stock.  PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 1, 6 (2002).  See 
generally William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275 (2002) (addressing the implications that the Enron collapse holds out for a 
self-regulatory system of corporate governance). 
 4. For a detailed exploration of this proposal, see generally Lynne L. Dallas, 
Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board 
Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1997). 
 5. Id. at 130–36. 
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information is important for a board with outside directors and can be 
accomplished by the appointment of a board ombudsperson by outside 
directors and also by establishing a strategic planning committee which 
provides a forum for outside directors to meet with management.  Query 
whether the Enron debacle would have occurred had Enron utilized a 
separate conflicts board composed of truly independent directors and 
sought to improve the flow of information to these independent directors 
as suggested by this proposal. 
Second, the business review board would consist of inside directors 
and outside directors, who may or may not be independent of management.  
This Article suggests that the performance of the insider-dominated 
board reported in the meta-analysis may indicate the advantage of group 
decisionmaking by peers (fellow executives), which decreases corporate 
politics and the chance that a dominant CEO will become convinced of 
his invincibility, as appeared to have been the case with Enron CEO 
Jeffrey Skilling.6  In addition, the quality of decisions is enhanced in 
ambiguous and uncertain situations when diverse perspectives are 
shared, and this sharing is encouraged when persons are in similar social 
positions (for example, all are directors of the corporation).  The 
business review board would make business decisions not within the 
jurisdiction of the conflicts board and would have various advantages in 
performing relational, strategic management, and some monitoring 
functions.  
To avoid confusion, it is important to point out that the dual board 
structure proposed here is not the same as the two-tiered board structure 
found in Germany.7  The division of functions in the two-tiered German 
board system is of supervision and management.  Both boards in the 
dual board structure perform supervision: The conflicts board performs 
mainly manager monitoring, and the business review board performs 
mainly relational monitoring.8  In addition, neither board in the German 
system is composed solely of independent outside directors, unlike the 
recommendation for the conflicts board in the dual board system.  In 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 184–92. 
 7. Dallas, supra note 4, at 96. 
 8. As explained later in this Article, the relational role of boards involves a two-
way relationship.  See infra text accompanying notes 130–31.  The relational director 
serves the corporation and enhances its ability to perform.  Id.  At the same time, the 
relational director is in a position to monitor the corporation to ensure the corporation’s  
consideration of the relational director’s interests, whether those interests are to comply 
with legal regulations or to consider the advancement of its female employees.  Id. 
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Germany, supervisory boards include employees and persons who have 
business relationships with the corporation.  In addition, the dual 
monitoring boards are not restricted in the way German supervisory 
boards are in conducting the business and affairs of the corporation.  
One feature of the German system that U.S. corporations may wish to 
consider is having employee representatives on their boards, or in the 
dual board system, on business review boards.  Employee directors not 
only would likely protect the employees’ stake in the corporation, which 
was substantially impacted by Enron’s governance, but also would bring 
diverse perspectives onto corporate boards.9  
This Article first discusses recent developments in board structure, 
composition, and practices that accommodate the manager-monitoring 
and relational roles of U.S. boards of directors.  It then explores the 
multiple roles of corporate boards, theoretically and empirically, and 
addresses issues relating to the strategic role of boards.  Finally, this 
Article turns to interpretations of recent empirical literature on corporate 
boards and proposals for reforming U.S. boards of directors. 
II.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MANAGER MONITORING                                     
BY U.S. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
More effective board supervision of managers is the objective of 
various reforms in recent years in the structure, composition, and 
practices of boards of directors of U.S. public corporations.  These 
reforms are encouraged by developments in fiduciary duty law, whereby 
courts apply a more deferential standard of review when reviewing 
corporate decisions made by independent directors.10  Thus, reforms to 
change the composition of boards to include more independent directors 
are supported by these decisions.  In addition, shareholders in the 1980s 
experienced board approvals of defensive tactics that effectively 
defeated takeovers that shareholders favored; this highlighted the 
managerial dominance of corporate boards.  This experience also had the 
effect of spurring board reform, particularly because institutional 
 
 9. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate 
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1403–05 (2002) (“[T]he evolving importance 
placed on diverse boards may indicate that it is time for U.S. corporations to consider 
stakeholder representation (e.g., employee-elected directors on U.S. corporate boards.”); 
see also Howard Fineman & Michael Isikoff, Lights Out: Enron’s Failed Power Play, 
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at 14 (noting the impact of Enron’s failure on employees). 
 10. State courts in the United States apply deferential standards to corporate 
decisions that are approved by independent directors.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (applying the deferential business judgment rule); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (excusing the demand requirement); Auerbach v. 
Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979) (deferring to an independent litigation 
committee in dismissing a shareholder derivative action). 
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ownership has increased.11  These institutional investors have become 
increasingly active in corporate governance because exit has become a 
less viable option and norms have changed concerning the appropriateness 
of their participation in corporate governance.12 
A.   Trends Towards Outside Directors on                                                  
U.S. Corporate Boards 
Probably the most significant trend in board governance in the United 
States in the last twenty years has been the increase in the number and 
proportion of outside directors on corporate boards of directors.13  This 
increase has naturally coincided with a decrease in the number and 
proportion of corporate insiders on boards.  Proxy statement data for 
1998 shows that corporate boards of public corporations in the United 
States average eleven directors, with two inside directors.14  This 
represents a decrease in the number of inside directors from 1993, when 
boards averaged three inside directors, and from 1973, when boards 
averaged five inside directors.15  In a study comparing the composition 
of boards of directors in 1970 and 1980, the decrease in inside directors 
was offset by independent directors.16  Independent directors included 
public and professional directors, private investors, and directors 
 
 11. Institutional ownership in the United States increased from 15.8% in 1970 to 
38% in 1981, 44.8% in 1986, and 53.3% in 1990.  James P. Hawley, Political Voice, 
Fiduciary Activism, and the Institutional Ownership of U.S. Corporations: The Role of 
Public and Noncorporate Pension Funds, 38 SOC. PERSP. 415, 417 (1995).  Large 
institutional investors doubled their share of the common stock market from 1980 to 
1996 and controlled over one-half of that market by 1996.  Paul A. Gompers & Andrew 
Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229 (2001). 
 12. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
520, 570–75 (1990); see also Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor 
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 143–44 (1988); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, 
Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 
157–63 (1988).  See generally THE CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES & GUIDELINES 3 (1988) (providing core principles that 
represent “the foundation for accountability between a corporation’s management and its 
owners” and guidelines that represent, in CalPERS’s view, “additional features that may 
further advance this relationship of accountability”), available at http://www.calpers-
governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-principles.pdf [hereinafter 
CALPERS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. 
 13. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 26TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 11 (1999). 
 14. Id. at 10–11. 
 15. Id. at 11. 
 16. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 1, at 113. 
DALLAS V. 40-3.DOC 1/8/2020  4:42 PM 
 
788 
employed by nonrelated business organizations.17  The proportion of 
relational outside directors consisting of financiers, consultants, legal 
counsel, and directors employed by related businesses did not change 
significantly during this period.18  
This trend towards fewer inside directors was fueled by the objective 
of making boards more independent from management.  As early as 
1975, Melvin Eisenberg made a persuasive case for having boards 
composed of a majority of outside directors who are independent of 
management in his foundational book, The Structure of the Corporation.19  
Psychological studies confirm the considerable pressures on directors to 
conform to the wishes of corporate insiders and thus the importance of 
true independence.20  
Today, numerous codes of best practices proposed and adopted in the 
United States and abroad by national stock exchanges, professional 
organizations, blue-ribbon committees of academicians, legal practitioners, 
and business leaders recommend independent outside directors on 
corporate boards of directors for more effective manager monitoring.21 
B.  Developments in U.S. Board Committees 
Attempts to improve manager monitoring have also been made in 
 
  17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 112–14. 
 19. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 170–77 (1976); 
see KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 5 (finding that it was generally accepted among 
U.S. public corporations that “[b]oards are composed primarily of independent directors 
who have no significant ties or conflicts of interest with the company”). 
 20. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 84–85; see Dallas, supra note 4, at 104–11. 
 21. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994); CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING 
STANDARDS COMM., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., JUNE 6, 2002 REPORT 25 (2002), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf [hereinafter JUNE 6, 2002 REPORT]; F.F. 
Du Plessis, Corporate Governance: Some Reflections on the South African Law and the 
German Two-Tier Board System, in 2 PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW 131, 136–37 
(Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997).  Numerous definitions are offered for “independent 
directors.”  Basically, directors will be considered independent if they (1) have never 
been an employee of the corporation or any of its subsidiaries, (2) are not a relative of an 
employee of the company, (3) provide no services to the company, (3) are not employed 
by any firm providing major services to the company, and (4) receive no compensation 
from the company, other than director fees.  NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS., REPORT 
OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON PERFORMANCE OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICERS, BOARDS, AND DIRECTORS 13–35 (1994).  Definitions of independence are 
found in the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the Internal Revenue Code.  They have also been developed by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company (FDIC), American Law Institute, Business Roundtable, National 
Association of Securities Dealers, New York Stock Exchange, and Council of 
Institutional Investors. See CALPERS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 12, at 104–11. 
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recent years by changing board structure through the use of committees.  
Management literature supports the use of committees for effective 
board functioning.22  Committees enhance board effectiveness by 
permitting directors both to use and develop expertise in specialized 
areas and to focus their energies on a subset of issues confronting the 
corporation.  The number of public corporations that now have audit 
committees composed of outside directors (although not necessarily 
independent directors) is a dramatic example of the increasing focus on 
manager monitoring by U.S. boards.  Board audit committees are 
intended to implement and support the boards’ manager-monitoring 
functions by periodically reviewing the corporations’ processes for 
compiling financial data, their internal controls, and the independence of 
the corporations’ external auditors.23  According to 1998 proxy statements, 
all public corporations have audit committees with an average of zero 
insiders on these committees.24  These committees have widespread 
support from a variety of sources, including national stock exchanges, 
professional organizations, and blue-ribbon committees formed in the 
United States and abroad.25  
Another board committee considered important to effective board 
manager monitoring is the compensation committee, which is 
responsible for setting and reviewing executive compensation.26  There 
is a consensus in the United States that good board practice requires a 
compensation committee composed of independent directors.27  According 
to a 1999 survey, ninety-six percent of the corporations surveyed have 
compensation committees composed solely of outside directors, 
 
 22. Diana Bilimoria & Sandy Kristin Piderit, Board Committee Membership: 
Effects of Sex-Based Bias, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1453, 1454 (1994). 
 23. 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 21, § 3A.03. 
 24. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 14. 
 25. BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT 
COMMS., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (1999),  available at  
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/blueribb.pdf [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON COMM.]; COMM. ON THE 
FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, DECEMBER 1992 REPORT §§ 4.30–4.39 (1992), 
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country_documents/uk/cadbury.pdf; NASDAQ, LISTING 
REQUIREMENTS AND FEES: THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET 9 (2003), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_ listing_req_fees.pdf; SEC. AND EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, 
REPORT OF THE KUMAR MANGALAM BIRLA COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 
9.1 (2002), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.jsp. 
 26. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 13. 
 27. CONFERENCE BD., BOARD DIVERSITY IN U.S. CORPORATIONS: BEST PRACTICES 
FOR BROADENING THE PROFILE OF CORPORATE BOARDS 20, 22 (1999). 
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although these directors are not necessarily independent directors.28  
This study chastised boards that have insiders on their compensation 
committees, explaining that outside directors are necessary for boards 
“to properly oversee their fiduciary responsibilities and operate 
independently of management.”29 
The third, most popular board manager-monitoring committee is the 
nominating committee, which is responsible for recommending board 
members to shareholders.30  Having a  nominating committee consisting 
of independent directors is considered good board practice.31  According 
to 1998 proxy statements, seventy five percent of public corporations have 
nominating committees composed, on average, entirely of outside directors.32 
Of course, having audit, compensation, and nominating committees 
does not guarantee effective manager monitoring.  Recently, there has 
been substantial attention paid to the decline in the quality of financial 
reporting by U.S. corporations.  In 1998, Arthur Levitt, the former 
chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
cautioned corporations against the manipulation of numbers, referred to 
as “earnings management,” which may assist corporations in attaining a 
short-term competitive advantage, but in the long run will undermine 
confidence in U.S. capital markets.33  The actual functioning of audit 
committees has varied among corporations, from being thorough to 
perfunctory, from having expert, professional committee members to 
having members who do not understand the basic principles of financial 
reporting.34  Proposals to address this situation have been made by the 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees, which was sponsored by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), and the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
whose 1999 report focused on the important role of the board audit 
committee in providing active and independent oversight.35  In 2000, the 
SEC adopted new rules and amendments based in large measure on the 
recommendations of this committee.36  Further reforms are receiving 
 
 28. SPENCER STUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 9 (1999).  According to the 
1998 proxy statements, ninety-nine percent of U.S. public corporations had compensation 
committees composed, on average, of only outside directors.  KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra 
note 13, at 13–14. 
 29. SPENCER STUART, supra note 28, at 9. 
 30. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 13. 
 31. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 22. 
 32. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 13. 
 33. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business 
(Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.  
For a discussion of earnings management, see Dallas, supra note 9, at 1380–82. 
 34. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, supra note 33. 
 35. BLUE RIBBON COMM., supra note 25, at 6. 
 36. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42266, 64 Fed. 
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considerable national attention as a result of accounting irregularities at 
Enron and other corporations.37  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
was passed in the wake of Enron, requires public corporations to have 
audit committees composed solely of independent directors and to 
disclose whether at least one member is a “financial expert.”38  The SEC 
has promulgated regulations on these subjects.39  In addition, the NYSE 
has proposed rules to the SEC dealing with the independence, authority, 
and responsibilities of audit committees.40  Compensation committees 
may have difficulty in monitoring executive compensation.  This 
difficulty is arguably reflected in the dramatic recent rise in executive 
compensation,41 the increasing use of stock options that may create 
inappropriate managerial incentives,42 and the growing differences in 
levels of compensation of U.S. executives when compared with the 
compensation of the average employee and corporate executives in 
other nations.43  Board nominating committees often do not consider 
shareholder nominees, which is a serious failing.44  In its proposed 
rules, the NYSE requires listed companies to have compensation and 
nominating board committees, which are to consist solely of 
 
Reg. 73389, 73390 (Dec. 30, 1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Fineman & Isikoff, supra note 9, at 24. 
 38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301(m)(3)(A), 407(a)–
(b), 116 Stat. 745, 775–76, 790 (2002).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further places 
responsibilities on corporate officers for financial reports and internal controls for 
financial reporting.  Id. §§ 302, 404. 
 39. See generally Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Release 
No. 34-47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 
229, 240, 249, 274); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Release No. 34-47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249). 
 40. See BLUE RIBBON COMM., supra note 25, at 13–14; Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 17, 2003) 
[hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 34-47672]. 
 41. The mean salaries and bonuses of CEOs rose by 97% between 1980 and 1994, 
and the mean value of stock options rose by 683%.  Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 661–62 (1998); see 
KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 7 (“Twenty-six percent [of U.S. directors surveyed] 
feel that CEO compensation is too high, but 50 percent think it is just right and 23 
percent think it is generally in line with economic conditions.”). 
 42. Dallas, supra note 9, at 1377–83; see infra text accompanying notes 65–69. 
 43. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003, at 
213–15 (2003) (showing that, by 2000, CEOs in major companies earned 310 times 
more than the average worker and that U.S. CEOs earn more than three times the 
average of the thirteen other advanced countries studied). 
 44. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 23. 
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independent directors, and these rules specify the committees’ duties 
and responsibilities.45 
C.  Other Recent Developments in Board Practices 
Increasing sophistication in monitoring is exhibited in recent board 
developments.  A number of public corporations are establishing 
standing board committees to review corporate governance processes.46  
One survey found that fifty-six percent of responding companies have 
corporate governance committees.47  Another study notes: “Increasingly, 
the corporate governance committee or the full board is appointing the 
committee chairman and members of the committees of the board with 
the concurrence of the chairman/CEO, instead of having these 
appointments made by the CEO alone.”48  A number of boards are also 
evaluating their own performances and, to a lesser extent, the 
performances of individual board members.49  Twenty percent of 
corporations surveyed evaluate individual directors formally and, as 
evidence of this emerging norm, seventy-three percent believe that this 
is a good corporate practice.50  Independent directors are also meeting 
separately from the boards to consider matters.51  This practice goes 
some distance to counter the social dynamics of boards that can stymie 
independent decisionmaking.52 
U.S. corporations have not taken steps to adopt certain proposals for 
 
 45. See JUNE 6, 2002 REPORT, supra note 21, at 9–11; Exchange Act Release No. 
34-47672, supra note 40.   
 46. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 6. 
 47. Id. (explaining that the corporate governance committee usually assumes the 
functions of the nominating committee); see CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 21. 
 48. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 6. 
 49. Id.  A 1998 survey of U.S. corporate directors showed “139 companies (23 
percent of sample) had a formal board evaluation process.  However, only 58 companies 
(9 percent) had an evaluation process for individual board members.”  CONFERENCE BD., 
supra note 27, at 28. 
 50. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 8. 
 51. Id. at 24–25.  Concerning U.S. corporations: 
[Sixty-nine] percent of the respondents report that their outside directors meet 
in executive session, other than for compensation matters, without the CEO 
present.  However, this does vary according to type and size of company.  
While only 56 percent of insurance companies meet in executive session, 75 
percent of the largest companies ($20 billion and over) do.  Respondents report 
that such meetings take place three times a year on average. 
Id. at 25.  The NYSE in its proposed rules proposes that nonmanagement directors meet 
at “regularly scheduled executive sessions without management.”  Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-47672, supra note 40, at 19053.  The nonmanagement directors include directors 
who are not independent.
 \d 6 
 52. See Dallas, supra note 4, at 104–11 (discussing the social dynamics that limit 
outside board members’ independence). 
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improving manager monitoring.  They have not appointed independent 
directors as board chairpersons or as lead directors.53  Board  leadership 
by independent directors could have a positive effect on the social 
dynamics of boards.54  But a 1999 survey of public corporations found 
that only nine percent of responding corporations had independent 
director chairpersons, thirty percent had lead directors, and the remaining 
corporations had no plans to implement either of these reforms.55 
Another proposal is to limit the number of directorships that a single 
director may hold. 56  This proposal is designed to ensure that directors 
have sufficient time to attend to the affairs of the corporation.  Few 
corporations have adopted this proposal,57 although corporations are 
increasingly limiting the number of directorships their executive officers 
may hold.58  This proposal is problematic to some because it does not 
guarantee that a director will spend any length of time on corporate 
affairs and does not take into account that some individuals may prefer 
to spend their time on board affairs rather than on other pursuits. 
A primary responsibility of the board of directors is to appoint the 
successor to the current CEO.  Directors of U.S. corporations believe  
that improvements are needed in this area.  A survey of public directors 
reveals that “many are critical of the management succession process.”59  
But based on 1998 proxy statements, only thirty-two percent of public 
corporations have management succession committees.60  
In conclusion, a number of changes have occurred in corporate 
structures, composition, and practices that are designed to improve the 
 
 53. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 54. See, e.g., ROBERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP 
ACTION 73 (1992).  See generally Susan E. Jackson, Consequences of Group Composition 
for the Interpersonal Dynamics of Strategic Issues Processing, 8 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC 
MGMT. 345, 370–71 (1992) (discussing the importance of leadership to group behavior). 
 55. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 8 (defining independent director chairmen 
as nonexecutive chairmen who are also not former employees of the corporation). 
 56. Id. at 26–27; see NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD 
BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR PROFESSIONALISM 12 (1996) (noting the 
commission’s awareness that “CEOs and directors themselves may have concerns about 
director over-commitment”). 
 57. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 7–8 (listing this proposal as a “lost 
cause”); CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 12. 
 58. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 26. 
 59. Id. at 7 (“Twenty-three percent [of directors surveyed] say most companies do 
a poor job, 27 percent say the CEO dominates the process and 30 percent say the board 
gets involved too late.”). 
 60. Id. at 13. 
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manager-monitoring functions of boards.  These reforms include the 
following: increasing the percentage of outside directors on corporate 
boards, creating committees composed predominantly of outside 
directors that specialize in important subjects requiring objective 
assessments, having outside directors meet separately from the entire 
board, decreasing the CEO’s control over the appointment of board and 
committee members, and encouraging the review of board and board 
members’ performance.  But more attention needs to be focused on the 
subject of whether outside directors are truly independent.  For example, 
as the facts are coming to light about Enron, it appears that many outside 
directors were not independent, but were benefiting from various kinds 
of financial relationships with Enron.61  In addition, attention needs to be 
given to board leadership through independent chairpersons or independent 
lead directors and to the methods by which independent directors are 
kept informed of important issues concerning the corporation.  For 
example, Enron directors claim that they were unaware of Enron’s 
accounting problems.62  This claim would be much harder to maintain 
had independent directors appointed a corporate ombudsperson to keep 
them informed. 
III.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONAL MONITORING                                    
BY U.S. BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
United States boards of directors are not limited to performing 
manager monitoring; they also perform relational monitoring.  Relational 
monitoring addresses the corporation’s substantial environmental 
uncertainties.  The corporation obtains access to information, advice, 
support, and legitimacy by furthering relationships with stakeholders 
through board memberships. 
A.   Shareholders 
An important relationship to the corporation is its relationship with its 
shareholders.  A 1999 study reports a “cultural change” in the last few 
years within the United States with respect to the relationship between 
shareholders and the boards of directors of public corporations, which 
“correspond[s] to a growing awareness by board members of their duty 
to properly represent the shareholders who elected them as directors.”63  
 
 61. See Christopher H. Schmitt et al., One Cozy Bunch, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Feb. 11, 2002, at 28. 
 62. Mark Babineck, Enron Debacle Exposes Board Conflicts, NORTH COUNTY 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, available at http://www.nctimes.net/news/2002/20020217/60100.html. 
 63. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 5. 
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Given that the prevailing legal theory provides that directors should 
operate corporations to benefit shareholders, this change in culture may 
seem mysterious.  Managerialism has predominated, however, as the 
mode of governance of U.S. public corporations.  Although substantial 
attention has been given in the past to ensuring the professionalism of 
managers, the operative goals of the corporation have been largely 
undefined.  The increasing power of institutional shareholders has 
changed the culture in which corporations operate today.64  Armed with 
the formal legal doctrine of shareholder primacy, institutional shareholders 
are currently pressuring directors to specify how the directors’ decisions 
serve the shareholders’ interests. 
In this vein, attempts are being made to align the interests of directors 
with those of shareholders.  A recent trend is to compensate outside 
directors, in whole or in part, with stock or stock options in order to 
align the outside directors’ financial interests with those of 
shareholders.65  One study shows that eighty-eight percent of companies 
offered stock compensation in 1998, compared with only thirty-three 
percent in 1990.66  Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly apparent 
that stock options do not align the interests of directors and shareholders.  
Because accounting rules do not require stock options to be recognized 
as expenses, corporate profits reported to shareholders are inflated.67  
These accounting rules also encourage the issuance of large amounts of 
options.  Eventually, corporate resources are diverted from real investments 
to share repurchases in order to satisfy the options once they are 
exercised.68  In addition, compensation with stock options encourages 
“earnings management,” or the manipulation of reported financial results 
to affect stock prices; Enron is an example of the damage that earnings 
management can cause.69 
 
 64. See Dallas, supra note 9, at 1373–76. 
 65. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 5. 
 66. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 32.  Based on 1998 proxy statement data, 
84% of U.S. public corporations compensated directors with some form of stock, as 
compared to 78% in 1997 and 62% in 1995.  KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 18. 
 67. See Matthias Benz et al., Are Stock Options the Managers’ Blessing?  Stock Option 
Compensation and Institutional Controls 5–6 (rev. version 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com; Dallas, supra note 9, at 1379–80; Daniel Murray, Employee Stock Options: The Fed Joins 
In, Report No. 142, at 1, 13 (2000), available at http://www.smithers.co.uk/aboutreports.shtml. 
 68. Daniel A. Bens et al., Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises, 
40 J. ACCT. RES. 359, 360 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com; Dallas, supra note 9, at 1380. 
 69. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, supra note 33 (discussing earnings management).  
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B.  Diversity on Corporate Boards 
The role of the board in providing an avenue for shareholders to 
influence the corporation is consistent with the formal view of the 
corporation as intended to further shareholder interests.70  However, 
competing views of the corporation are found in both case law and 
commentary.  For example, Adolph Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, in their 
famous debate in the 1930s, considered the significance of the separation 
of control from ownership that results from the ownership of shares by 
dispersed, public shareholders.71  Berle and Dodd ultimately agreed that 
the corporation was not only a profit-making entity, but also an 
institution with social responsibilities.72  Dodd claimed that “business is 
permitted and encouraged by the law primarily because it is of service to 
the community rather than because it is a source of profit to its 
owners.”73  Case law supports the existence of a fiduciary duty of 
directors to the corporate entity as distinct from its shareholders.74  
Under this conception of fiduciary duty, directors are trustees for the 
corporation and arguably for the stakeholders who comprise it.  In more 
recent years, this view has been codified in a number of constituency 
(stakeholder) statutes enacted in over one-half of the states in the United 
States.  These statutes permit directors to take into account in their 
decisionmaking the interests of stakeholders, at least in tender offer 
situations.75  Moreover, in the important corporate law state of Delaware, 
which does not have a constituency statute, the Delaware Supreme Court 
has stated that directors may take into account the interests of 
 
See generally Dallas, supra note 9, at 1380–82. 
 70. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and 
Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 95–96 (1988) (describing the relationship between 
the corporation and shareholders as one of informal or formal cooptation). 
 71. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, 
Corporate Managers], and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the 
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1934). 
 72. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 166–69 
(1954); see also Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 
BUS. LAW. 149, 150 (1968). 
 73. Dodd, Corporate Managers, supra note 71, at 1149. 
 74. See Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568, 571 (N.J. 1910) (stating that “the 
corporation itself is an entity wholly separate and distinct from the individuals who 
compose and control it”); McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 238 (N.Y. 1934) 
(Lehman, J., concurring); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 293–94 (1999); Thomas A. 
Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 243 & n.70 (1999). 
 75. See James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 97 (1991). 
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employees, consumers, and other stakeholders in making decisions as 
long as these decisions have a mere rational relationship to furthering a 
shareholder interest.76   
In addition, there is increasing interest by U.S. public corporations in 
having corporate boards represent the interests of a diverse society.77  
This development arguably represents recognition of the value of 
stakeholder capitalism, although the discussion among directors and 
other businesspersons proceeds emphatically in the traditionally 
acceptable context of enhancing shareholder value.  One study of board 
best practices, which is based on the opinions of working groups of 
corporate executives, investors, and directors throughout the United 
States, found that “diversity is [considered] a key part of good 
governance.”78  Diversity was defined to include diversity in terms of 
gender, race, and cultural diversity as companies become international.79  
The study reports considerable consensus among the working groups 
that there are substantial economic arguments in favor of diversity on 
corporate boards as “companies broaden the scope of what they consider 
relevant to creating shareholder value to include things like workplace 
practices and customer satisfaction.”80 
A substantial number of directors, particularly of the largest 
corporations, consider it important to have minority representation on 
the board.  The reason is “to better reflect the changing marketplace and 
the growth in minority market segments.”81  Service industries, such as 
 
 76. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 77. For an extended discussion of the significance of this development, see Dallas, 
supra note 9, at 1383–85. 
 78. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 3 (stating that the diversity focus does not 
change the board’s obligations as fiduciaries to represent all shareholders, “but rather 
helps a board fulfill its duties and mission”). 
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. Id.  The report states that “[s]hareholder value is strengthened when intangibles such 
as diversity, workplace practices, and customer satisfaction permeate a company.”  Id. at 3. 
 81. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 13.  According to 1998 proxy statements, 
60% of public corporations have ethnic minorities on their boards: 39% of the companies 
have African Americans on their boards, 12% have Latino directors, and 9% have Asian 
directors.  Id. at 11–12; see also SPENCER STUART, supra note 28, at 6.  Ethnic minorities 
account, however, for only 6% of Fortune 500 company directors.  KORN/FERRY INT’L, 
supra note 13, at 11.  Based on a survey of directors, 29% of U.S. companies plan to 
increase the numbers of African American directors, 14% plan to increase the number of 
Latino directors, and 10% plan to increase the number of Asian directors.  Id. at 12–13. 
Minorities are also underrepresented in the executive suite.  Dan R. Dalton & Catherine 
M. Daily, The Other Ceiling, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 19.  Moreover, 
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the motel, restaurant, telephone, and airline industries, which have 
substantial minority employees, are found to have more minority 
representation on boards, indicating a labor stakeholder orientation.82  In 
addition, there is substantial support for having women on corporate 
boards to perform relational functions.83  James Preston, retired CEO of 
Avon Products, stated that because “60% of all purchases in this country 
are made by women, having women on the board just makes good 
business sense.”84  Having women on boards also permits the corporation to 
send important signals to current female managers and potential recruits.85 
The fact that minorities and women on boards contribute to the 
performance of all board roles should not be overlooked.  For example, 
the consideration of women and minorities permits the corporation to 
take advantage of the full range of intellectual capital available to it.86  
As one CEO of a Fortune 1000 company said of women: “When you 
open positions to both sexes, you double the number of people in the top 
10, or in the top 1% of ability in the marketplace.”87  Moreover, one 
study found that women are not “token” directors, but are on the boards 
because of their business expertise and access to information and 
 
minority women of color are underrepresented in the managerial labor force when 
compared with their participation in the total labor force.  Margaret Blackburn White & 
Joseph Potts, Just the Facts: Women of Color in U.S. Corporations, DIVERSITY FACTOR, 
Spring 1999, at 8. 
 82. Gerald E. Fryxell & Linda D. Lerner, Contrasting Corporate Profiles: Women and 
Minority Representation in Top Management Positions, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 341, 345 (1989). 
 83. Unlike the glass ceiling women have reached in seeking to enter the executive 
suite, see CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 26, women have made slow, yet steady 
progress in the boardroom.  The number of Fortune 500 companies with one or more 
women on their boards increased from 69% in 1993 to 86% in 1998.  Id. at 16–17.  This 
represents an increase in the percentage of total board seats held by women from 8.3% in 
1993 to 11.1% in 1998 (percentages vary by industry).  Id. at 17; see also KORN/FERRY 
INT’L, supra note 13, at 11; SPENCER STUART, supra note 28, at 6.  Larger companies 
tend to have more women on their boards.  CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 18 
(showing that corporations located in the U.S. Northeast also tend to have more women 
on their boards).  The percentage of Fortune 500 companies with more than one woman 
director increased from 29.2% in 1993 to 37.6% in 1998, with 6.8% of such companies 
in 1998 having three or more women directors.  Id. at 17.  Bilimoria says, “Although 85 
percent of the CEOs considered it important to have female directors, 48 percent found 
female candidates ‘difficult to identify,’ and cited this as a reason for current low levels 
of female directorships.”  Diana Bilimoria, Women Directors: The Quiet Discrimination, 
CORPORATE BOARD, July/Aug. 1995, at 10.  There currently is no consensus on whether 
qualified women are available to increase the number of women on corporate boards.  
See Donna Dillon Manning, Women Directors: A CEO Priority, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 
Spring 1995, at 19, 21. 
 84. Catherine M. Daily et al., A Decade of Corporate Women: Some Progress in 
the Boardroom, None in the Executive Suite, 20 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 93, 94 (1999). 
 85. Id. at 94–98. 
 86. Id. at 96–97. 
 87. Manning, supra note 83, at 20. 
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resources the corporation requires.88  The percentage of female outside 
directors with corporate backgrounds rose from 13.3% in 1987 to 37.6% 
in 1996, twelve years later.89  Moreover, the percentage of women 
serving as outside directors who represent organizations that provide 
services to the corporation rose from 13.3% in 1987 to 32.6% in 1996.90 
Some studies have examined whether there are sex-based biases in the 
appointment of women directors to board committees.  A study based on 
1983 data found sex-based biases in committee assignments, even after 
controlling for experience-based characteristics.91  This study observed 
that female directors were as qualified as, if not better qualified than, 
their male counterparts on most characteristics examined.  Women were 
favored over men for public affairs committee memberships, and men 
were favored over women for the more powerful compensation and 
executive committees.92  But this data is outdated, and the small number 
of female directors makes reliance on this study, as well as on studies 
attempting to link the presence of female or minority directors to 
corporate performance, problematic. 
A survey of corporate directors found that twenty percent of directors 
expressed the desire to add foreign directors to their boards “to enhance 
their global perspective.”93  Although time and distance barriers exist to 
having non-U.S. directors on corporate boards, these barriers are being 
overcome by fewer, but possibly longer, board meetings and video 
teleconferencing.94  A study of global corporations found that the 
corporations that added foreign directors to their boards did so to acquire 
an in-depth understanding of new markets, to comprehend a new 
customer base, to deal with the demands of international investors, and 
to gain credibility in certain capital markets or political environments.95 
 
 88. Daily et al., supra note 84, at 96–97. 
 89. Id. at 96. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Bilimoria & Piderit, supra note 22, at 1469–70.  But see Idalene F. Kesner, 
Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership: An Investigation of Type, 
Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66, 70 (1988).  
 92. Bilimoria & Piderit, supra note 22, at 1464–65.  Women directors of U.S. 
companies are most likely to be on audit and social/corporate responsibility committees 
(14% and 15%, respectively) and are least likely to be on executive committees (6%).  
They are most likely to chair social or corporate responsibility committees (21%).  
CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 30. 
 93. SPENCER STUART, supra note 28, at 5. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. CONFERENCE BD., GLOBALIZING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: TRENDS AND 
STRATEGIES 15 (1999). 
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The discussion concerning board diversity in the United States takes 
place in the context of improving corporate returns for shareholders.  
Shareholders, including institutional investors, have been active in using 
the corporate proxy machinery to further diversity within the company, 
including on boards.  Shareholder board diversity proposals at Cypress 
Semiconductor and American Power Conversion have received 
supporting votes as high as 43.8% and 30.1%, respectively.96  Although 
business leaders indicate little support for having constituency or special 
interest directors on boards,97 the issues focused on for improving 
returns to shareholders include stakeholder concerns, such as workplace 
practices and customer satisfaction.98  Corporations with diverse boards 
are expected to have greater sensitivity to these stakeholder issues;99 
thus, diverse boards enable these corporations to more effectively relate 
to their socioeconomic environment.  Boards also perform other 
relational roles that facilitate the corporations’ interactions with their 
environment.  Corporations benefit from understanding their legal and 
financial environment and supplier markets.  Between 1970 and 1980,  
twenty-six percent of board members were financiers, consultants, legal 
counsel, and directors employed by related businesses.100 
In summary, boards perform various relational roles by having 
persons on their boards who assist the corporations in dealing with 
environmental uncertainties.  These persons lend legitimacy to the 
corporations and help the corporations in their operations by, among 
other things, assisting the corporation in effectively relating to 
shareholders and various other corporate stakeholders. 
 
 96. Susan Williams, 2001 Background Report E, Board Diversity 2–3 (Feb. 12, 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 97. Id. at 9–10; NAT’L ASS’N OF CORPORATE DIRS., supra note 56, at 11–12. 
 98. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 9; see also Manning, supra note 83, at 19, 
21 (noting that in a survey of over one-third of the CEOs of Fortune 1000 companies, the 
following percentages of CEOs sought to have women directors to (1) “exemplify 
commitment to diversity to shareholders” (60%), (2) “exemplify commitment to 
advancing women” (59%), (3) “enhance the ability to recruit and retain women” (46%), 
(4) “initiate discussions about issues that affect female employees” (29%), (5) “reflect 
female consumers’ perspectives” (26%), and (6) “contribute a perspective different from 
those of male directors” (49%)). 
 99. For example, one report observes that issues like family life and flexible work 
arrangements are given greater prominence in companies that attract both female 
executives and female board members.  CONFERENCE BD., supra note 27, at 8, 27 (stating 
that the Executive Leadership Council proposes that companies conduct a self-audit, 
which would include making “key stakeholder evaluations”). 
 100. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 1, at 113. 
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IV.  ROLES OF CORPORATE BOARDS: THEORIES AND                          
EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The board of directors is expected to perform a number of functions.  
This has confounded the empirical literature on corporate boards and has 
made it difficult to find definitive answers concerning principles of 
board composition, structure, and process.  This Section explores board 
theories and empirical findings on corporate board functioning. 
A.  Manager Monitoring and the Shareholder-Relational                             
Role of Corporate Boards 
Agency cost theory, originating in research in finance and economics, 
explains that corporate boards are used to reduce agency costs, which are 
“costs imposed on the principal [shareholders] when an agent with 
discretionary authority [management] takes actions to help himself, 
rather than the principal.”101  Boards of directors are intended to ensure  
that managers act in the interests of shareholders rather than in their own 
personal interests. 102  This theory embraces the manager-monitoring and 
the shareholder-relational roles of boards.  Manager monitoring is 
intended to curtail managerial self-dealing, negligence, and the lack of 
professionalism on the part of management in attending to the affairs of 
the corporation.  Boards mediate the relationship between corporate 
shareholders and management by providing the appropriate oversight 
and incentives for management to protect the interests of shareholders. 
Three agency cost theories are offered that are relevant to board 
composition.  The first theory focuses on the importance of outside 
directors to effective manager monitoring.  According to this theory, the 
board performs manager monitoring primarily by providing a forum for 
competition among top managers for the top management position.103  
The outside directors on the board “act as arbiters in disagreements 
 
 101. LARRY RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 1.02, at 4 (3d 
ed. 1996). 
 102. See Rita D. Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate 
Governance, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 163, 167–68 (1987); Shaker A. Zahra & John A. Pearce 
II, Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative 
Model, 15 J. MGMT. 291, 301 (1989). 
 103. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288, 293 (1980); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 314–15 (1983) (describing the board as a 
“top-level court of appeals of the internal agent [labor] market”). 
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among internal managers,”104 rank internal managers,105 and provide 
appropriate incentives for managers to act in the interests of shareholders.106  
This agency cost theory relies on outside directors to evaluate competing 
executives and suggests that a mix of both inside and outside directors 
on boards enhances board performance.  
The second, more recent agency cost theory focuses on the role of 
inside directors in monitoring the CEO directly, without the outside 
directors playing a role.107  This agency cost theory, referred to in this 
Article as the “managerial-incentive theory,” claims that inside directors 
are superior to outside directors in evaluating CEOs.  According to this 
theory, because of their superior access to information concerning strategic 
decisionmaking by CEOs, inside directors are better at evaluating CEOs 
and providing them with appropriate incentives to engage in strategic 
risk taking.108 This theory recommends an insider-dominated board for 
more effective manager monitoring. 
The third agency cost theory is called the “substitute” hypothesis.  
This theory claims that manager monitoring by corporate boards may, in 
certain situations, be less cost-effective than other forms of corporate 
monitoring, in which case these other forms of monitoring will substitute 
for corporate board manager monitoring.109  For example, it is argued 
that, in certain industries, stock ownership by managers,110 increased 
corporate leverage,111 and increased dividend payouts112 will provide 
 
 104. Fama & Jensen, supra note 103, at 315. 
 105. Id. at 314. 
 106. Id.; see also Fama, supra note 103, at 293. 
 107. Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of 
Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
72, 73–74 (1990). 
 108. See infra text accompanying notes 154–57. 
 109. See Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala & Ramesh P. Rao, The Determinants of Board 
Composition: An Agency Theory Perspective, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 59, 
59–60 (1995); James A. Brickley & Christopher M. James, The Takeover Market, 
Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking, 30 J.L. 
& ECON. 161, 162 (1987). 
 110. Bathala & Rao, supra note 109, at 62, 63, 66.  But see Benjamin E. Hermalin 
& Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition, 19 RAND J. ECON. 
589, 594 (1988) (containing findings that contradict the predictions of the substitute 
hypothesis when family directors are considered). 
 111. Bathala & Rao, supra note 109, at 62, 63, 66.  But see John A. Pearce II & 
Shaker A. Zahra, Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective, 29 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 411, 421 (1992) (discussing the findings of a positive relationship between 
increased proportions of outside directors on corporate boards and increased leverage); 
Jeffrey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The 
Organization and Its Environment, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 218, 224 (1972) (finding an 
inverse relationship between higher debt/equity ratios and the proportion of inside 
directors on corporate boards). 
 112. Bathala & Rao, supra note 109, at 62, 63, 66.  But see Michael H. Schellenger 
et al., Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and Dividend Policy, 15 J. 
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managers with appropriate incentives, thus negating the need for 
manager monitoring by corporate boards of directors.  Thus, according to 
the substitute hypothesis, no general recommendation applicable to all 
corporations is appropriate concerning the composition of corporate boards. 
The first agency cost theory, which predicts a reduction of agency 
costs by the presence of outside directors on corporate boards, has been 
tested in studies examining situations where managers have conflicts of 
interest with shareholders.113  These studies try to test the ability of 
outside directors to engage in effective manager monitoring, although 
the studies do not determine whether this monitoring occurs through the 
outside directors’ observation of competition among inside directors.114  
Empirical studies test the relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors on corporate boards and the adoption of antitakeover devices, 
which are presumed to be harmful to shareholders but beneficial to 
managers.115  These studies report mixed results.116  These results are not 
surprising, however, because whether these antitakeover devices operate 
to benefit or harm shareholders depends on the context in which they are 
used.  In addition, studies on the relationship of the proportion of outside 
directors on corporate boards and the level of executive compensation 
report inconsistent findings.117  Levels of executive compensation, 
however, are arguably more a reflection of industrial norms and market 
constraints than the manager-monitoring capability of individual 
boards.118  Studies on executive turnover may be more reflective of the 
benefits of outside directors on corporate boards.  These studies have 
 
MGMT. 457, 465 (1989) (giving support that the substitution hypothesis is not confirmed 
regarding the relationship between the proportion of outside directors on the board and 
dividend payouts). 
 113. See studies cited infra notes 116, 117, 119. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See studies cited infra note 116. 
 116. Kosnik, supra note 102, at 167; see Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside 
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. 
REV. 898, 932–36, 962 (1996); Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of Board 
Composition and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of “Poison Pills,” 35 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 1010, 1010, 1023–25, 1028–30 (1992); Paula L. Rechner et al., Corporate Governance 
Predictors of Adoption of Anti-Takeover Amendments: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 371, 371 (1993). 
 117. Brickley & James, supra note 109, 163, 177–80; see Hamid Mehran, Executive 
Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J.  FIN.  ECON. 163, 180 (1995). 
 118. See generally John M. Bizjak et al., Has the Use of Peer Groups Contributed to 
Higher Levels of Executive Compensation? (Dec. 11, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=252544. 
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more consistently found a positive relationship between the proportion 
of outside directors on corporate boards and executive turnover.119  But a 
problem with many of these studies is that they fail to differentiate 
between independent and nonindependent outside directors.  The outside 
directors studied often include directors who have business relationships 
with the corporation and directors who may have significant social 
relationships with the CEO. 
In addition, the independence of outside directors is diminished when 
outside directors serve on boards with inside directors.  Psychological 
studies on group behavior indicate that members of groups operate under 
social pressures that encourage conformity to the group, or lack of 
objectivity.120  Studies also show “a correlation between the capacity to 
exert influence and one’s position in a hierarchical social structure.”121  
CEOs often assume the leadership positions on boards.  CEOs, 
particularly as board chairpersons, exert considerable influence over 
outside board members.  Thus, the structure of corporate boards does not 
support independence on the part of outside directors.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that studies often do not find differences in boards when 
additional outside directors are added.  Some outside directors do 
exercise more independence than others, and the dominance of these 
directors on important board committees may have positive effects.  
However, the socialization process of board group memberships often 
robs these directors of much-needed independence.  It is also important 
to point out that empirical literature is further confounded by those 
situations where nonindependent outside directors have interests that are 
negatively affected by managerial self-dealing or negligence.  In those 
situations, nonindependent directors have incentives to effectively 
monitor management.  
The second agency cost theory, the managerial-incentive theory, is 
discussed later in this Article.122  The third theory, the substitute 
hypothesis, which predicts that agency cost reduction methods may 
substitute for having outside directors on corporate boards, has received, 
at most, moderate empirical support.123  There are inconsistent findings 
relating to the proposition that increased leverage, high dividend 
payouts, and stock ownership substitute for outside directors on 
corporate boards.124 
 
 119. E.g., Lin, supra note 116, at 962; Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and 
CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 passim (1988). 
 120. Dallas, supra note 4, at 108–11. 
 121. JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL INFLUENCE 131, 136–41 (1991). 
 122. See infra Part V.B. 
 123. See supra notes 109–12. 
 124. Id. 
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B.  The Broad Relational Roles of Corporate Boards 
This Section introduces the resource dependence theory, which 
explains the relational role of corporate boards.  This theory, grounded 
in sociology and organizational behavior theory, explains that 
corporations seek to decrease uncertainty by gaining access to needed 
resources, tangible and intangible, through board memberships.125  
Outside board members permit the corporation to do the following: (1) 
coordinate with its external environment, (2) obtain advice and access to 
information from directors with differing backgrounds, skills, and 
networks, (3) enhance the support, status, and legitimacy of the 
corporation in the eyes of relevant audiences, and (4) effectuate 
monitoring of the strategic direction of the corporation.126  Inside 
directors perform similar functions for the corporation by reflecting the 
views and diverse interests of various departments and functional units 
within the corporation itself.  Thus the board, according to resource 
dependence theory, is used as a “bridging strategy”127 or “boundary 
scanning”128 device that enables the corporation to mediate its 
relationships with various stakeholders and others who comprise its 
external and internal environment.  According to the resource 
dependence perspective, women, minority, and foreign directors provide 
advice, support, enhanced status, and legitimacy to the corporation’s 
operations.  These functions may also be provided by having bankers, 
environmentalists, major suppliers, and customers on corporate boards.  
Thus, “because of their prestige in their professions and communities, 
directors are able to extract resources for successful company 
operations. . . . [T]hese activities are believed to enhance the firm’s 
legitimacy in society and to help it achieve goals of efficiency and 
improved performance.”129 
 
 125. Catherine M. Daily & Charles Schwenk, Chief Executive Officers, Top 
Management Teams, and Boards of Directors: Congruent or Countervailing Forces?,  
22 J. MGMT. 185, 191–94 (1996); Dallas, supra note 70, at 91–94; Pearce & Zahra, supra 
note 111, at 417–18; Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 297–99. 
 126. Daily & Schwenk, supra note 125, at 190–91, 194, 196; Dallas, supra note 4, 
at 102; Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 12–13 (1996); Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 297–99. 
 127. Dallas, supra note 70, at 91–94; Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 297. 
 128. Daily et al., supra note 84, at 95. 
 129. Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 297.  The singular focus on the managerial-
monitoring function of corporate boards in the U.S. legal academy has tended to 
downplay the important relational roles that boards perform.  Professor Eisenberg has 
argued that corporations may gain access to resources, such as advice, information, and 
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Resource dependence theory also explains the two-way relationship 
represented by board memberships.130  The corporation benefits from the 
abilities of relational board members.  Internal and external interests also 
benefit because relational directors are able to influence the corporation.  
For example, a woman on the board may influence the corporation to 
consider human resource issues of particular concern to women.  A 
banker or lawyer may influence the amount of corporate attention 
directed to financial or regulatory concerns.  Inside directors employed 
by foreign divisions or sales divisions of the corporation may gain 
attention for the needs of their divisions.  An important factor in 
determining the ability of these board members to influence corporations 
is the perceived dependence of the corporations on the resources 
provided by these members, which perception in turn is influenced by 
the board members themselves.131 
Related to the resource dependence theory is the strategic contingency 
perspective, which explains that a corporation’s environment, strategy, 
and past performance are strategic contingencies facing the corporation.  
Board composition reflects these strategic contingencies, which are 
important to the corporation’s effectiveness and survival.132  Studies 
have shown that corporations that utilize board memberships to acquire 
resources for the corporation enhance their performance.133  For 
example, in the nonprofit sector, positive associations have been found 
between board composition and the ability of nonprofit agencies to raise 
 
legitimacy, by means other than board memberships.  See EISENBERG, supra note 19, at 
157–58.  But board members provide the corporation with relevant advice and 
information on a continuing basis due to their membership on the board, thus providing 
the corporations with assistance as their circumstances change.  Moreover, the 
information is provided in a setting where joint deliberation is possible and where all 
members possess fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the corporation.  
Furthermore, many outside board members are CEOs of other corporations and would 
not provide resources to the corporation if they were not board members.  CEOs’ 
acceptance of board memberships as opposed to independent consulting contracts is a 
socially acceptable way for CEOs to interact with corporations other than their own.  
Also, the lure of board memberships to CEOs is not the opportunity to provide 
independent advice, but more the experience of interacting with other knowledgeable 
individuals on business problems and the prestige associated with board memberships.  
KORN/FERRY INT’L, 22ND ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 31 (1995); see also JAY 
W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S 
CORPORATE BOARDS 23–30 (1989); Cox & Munsinger, supra note 20, at 96–97. 
 130. See Dallas, supra note 70, at 92–97. 
 131. See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF  
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 43, 53 (1978); JAMES D. 
THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 31 (1967); Richard M. Emerson, Power-
Dependence Relations, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 31, 32 (1962); David J. Hickson et al., 
Organization as Power, in 3 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 151, 159–60 
(L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1981). 
 132. Pearce & Zahra, supra note 111, at 415. 
 133. See Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 297–99. 
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funds.134  In a study of eighty corporations, deviations from an optimal 
ratio of inside to outside directors were related to poor performance.135  
Moreover, in a survey of the CEOs of 119 Fortune 500 corporations, 
environmental uncertainty was found to be related to the proportion of 
outside directors on corporate boards.136  Uncertainties respecting a 
corporation’s customers, competitors, suppliers, technology, as well as the 
corporation’s economic and political circumstances, were considered.137  
The authors concluded that having higher proportions of outside directors 
on corporate boards was a viable way of “co-opting the environment and 
reducing uncertainty surrounding strategy development and execution.”138 
C.  The Strategic Roles of Corporate Boards 
A board of directors’ manager-monitoring and relational functions 
concerning corporate strategy include the following: (1) involvement in 
setting the corporation’s overall goals or missions, (2) overseeing and 
setting guidelines for the development and implementation of corporate 
strategy, (3) pointing out strategic opportunities and issuing warnings 
about environmental threats, and (4) evaluating senior executives with 
regard to their choices of strategic initiatives and implementation of 
strategic choices.139  These manager-monitoring and relational functions 
concerning corporate strategy are more specifically referred to as 
“strategic monitoring.”  More controversial is whether the board should also 
engage in “strategic management,” that is, in the actual development and 
implementation of corporate strategy.140  Although particular situations 
may warrant a board’s involvement in strategic management, such 
involvement at the very least duplicates corporate management’s 
responsibilities, with all the attendant problems that duplication entails.  
There are advantages in having management perform strategic management 
functions because of the amount of time that management has to devote 
 
 134. See Keith G. Provan, Board Power and Organizational Effectiveness Among 
Human Service Agencies, 23 ACAD. MGMT. J. 221, 226–27 (1980); Mayer N. Zald, 
Urban Differentiation, Characteristics of Boards of Directors, and Organizational 
Effectiveness, 73 AM. J. SOC. 261, 268 (1967). 
 135. Pfeffer, supra note 111, at 226. 
 136. Pearce & Zahra, supra note 111, at 418, 423. 
 137. Id. at 425. 
 138. Id. at 432. 
 139. Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 301–02. 
 140. Kenneth R. Andrews, Directors’ Responsibility for Corporate Strategy, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1980, at 30. 
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to such efforts and because of managerial expertise.  Moreover, 
separating strategic management and monitoring functions creates a 
structure designed to enhance accountability. 
According to the resource dependence theory, directors are boundary 
scanning agents who have access to important information that enables 
them to assist corporations in setting goals, embracing opportunities, and 
avoiding threats.141  Moreover, as agency cost theory points out, the 
monitoring of managerial performance requires attention to corporate 
strategy, including overseeing and evaluating the development and 
implementation of corporate strategy by executive officers.  Thus, the 
manager-monitoring and relational board functions involve corporate 
strategy.  Boards also perform a third role when they perform strategic 
management functions. 
A recent survey of over one thousand directors of large U.S. 
corporations indicates that corporate boards are becoming increasingly 
active in strategic monitoring and possibly in strategic management.142  
This survey found that: 
Over 40 percent of our respondents say their boards spend considerable time on 
strategy and over 60 percent contend that they are deeply involved in the 
strategy-setting process.  Surprisingly, 54 percent say they participate in an annual 
retreat or special planning session.  And a very strong 80 percent believe that 
their boards have sufficient and relevant expertise to evaluate strategic options.  
Again, we recognize that there are many companies that leave the strategic 
planning function almost exclusively to the CEO as part of the management 
process, but our respondents strongly suggest that it is the board’s responsibility 
to become involved in both the setting and the review of strategic goals.143 
The answer to a specific question by these respondents indicates that 
boards mainly perform strategic monitoring functions.  In this question, 
the respondents were asked to choose the statement that best describes 
their board’s role concerning corporate strategy: (1) “Reviews strategy 
after it is developed,” (2) “Helps develop the strategy,” or (3) “Plays no 
role.”  Over sixty percent of the respondents chose the first answer, 
indicating that their boards review strategy after it is developed, which 
means that their boards perform strategic monitoring rather than 
strategic management functions.144 
D.  Rejection of Service, Strategy, and Control as                             
Descriptions of Board Roles 
While this Article describes board roles as manager-monitoring, relational, 
 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 125–29. 
 142. KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
  143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 41 tbl.36. 
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and possibly strategic management, some organizational literature refers 
to board roles as service, strategy, and control.145  However, the latter 
categorization of board roles is problematic.  For example, the service 
role of boards is defined as “enhancing company reputation, establishing 
contacts with the external environment, and giving counsel and advice to 
executives.”146  These functions are explained by the resource dependence 
perspective on corporate boards, but the service depiction of these functions 
neglects the two-way nature of the resource dependence perspective.  
The service depiction does not consider the fact that board members not 
only provide services, but also obtain opportunities to influence the 
corporation through board memberships.  These service and influence 
functions are more appropriately referred to as the relational role rather 
than the service role of boards. 
In addition, the control role is subsumed within manager-monitoring 
and relational functions and is a misleading description of board 
functions.  Although the board has the legal power to control the 
corporation, at most it monitors the corporation and influences corporate 
policy; control is primarily in the hands of management.  This reality is 
reflected in provisions of state statutes on board responsibilities and in 
the more recent recommendations of the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which separately specify the 
control functions of management and the monitoring functions of 
boards.147  Finally, the strategy role of boards is potentially quite broad 
and may encompass strategic monitoring and strategic management.  
While the manager-monitoring and relational roles cover the former 
function, they do not necessarily cover the latter.  Thus, if boards 
perform or ought to perform strategic management functions, there is a 
third role of boards, which is more accurately called the strategic 
management role.  Categorizing the board roles as monitoring, relational, 
and possibly strategic management is, therefore, more accurate and 
helpful than describing board roles as service, control, and strategy. 
 
 145. E.g., Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 298. 
 146. Id. at 292.  These functions have also been referred to as “institutional” 
functions, whereby “boards help to link the organization to its external environment and 
secure critical resources, including prestige and legitimacy.”  Jerry Goodstein et al., The 
Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 241, 
241 (1994). 
 147. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (providing that the business of 
every corporation “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board” (emphasis 
added)); 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 21, §§ 3.01, 3.02 (1994). 
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V.  RESEARCH ON OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND THE MULTIPLE                    
ROLES OF CORPORATE BOARDS 
The empirical literature has been mixed on whether there is a positive, 
a negative, or no relationship between inside/outside board member 
composition and corporate performance.148  However, one meta-analysis 
of such studies found a curvilinear relationship between inside/outside 
board member composition and return on assets (ROA), although not 
return on equity.149  That is, boards more dominated either by outside or 
by inside directors were found to have a positive effect on ROA.  The 
following Subsections explore alternative explanations of these findings. 
A.  Different Strategies 
Assuming the findings of this study are replicated in future studies, the 
authors of the meta-analysis suggest that a board predominantly 
composed of outside or inside directors may support alternative business 
strategies, with each set of strategies providing avenues for improved 
corporate performance.150  The choice of strategies may follow from the 
inside directors’ greater firm-specific knowledge and the outside 
directors’ access to information and connections external to the 
corporation.  The researchers speculate as follows: 
[N]ote that insiders’ greater knowledge of company affairs and internal 
operations is compatible with a focus on asset allocation strategies and 
attainment of related efficiencies, therefore, with movement toward stronger 
ROA through control of working assets.  In contrast, outsiders’ greater 
knowledge about and experience with external affairs seems more consistent 
with the formulation of environmental strategies, leading to strengthened ROA 
though the enhancement of income sources and streams.151 
Similarly, another researcher suggests that differences in information 
 
 148. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 1, at 104; Rajeswararao S. Chaganti et al., 
Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry, 22 J. 
MGMT. STUDIES 400, 406–07, 411–12 (1985); William Q. Judge, Jr., Correlates of 
Organizational Effectiveness: A Multilevel Analysis of a Multidimensional Outcome, 13 
J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 7 (1994); Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, 
Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 180 (1995); Pearce & Zahra, 
supra note 111, at 433; Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board 
Independence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175, 190 (1990); Schellenger et 
al., supra note 112, at 465; Zahra & Pearce, supra note 102, at 316.  A recent meta-analysis 
found little evidence of a linear relationship between board composition measured by the 
proportion of outside or inside board members and corporate performance.  Dan R. Dalton 
et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial 
Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269, 269 (1998). 
 149. Wagner et al., supra note 2. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 671. 
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may cause outside directors to focus on new market entry through 
venturing and acquisition activities and inside directors to focus on 
internal business and product development. 152  
Thus, boards composed predominantly of either inside or outside 
directors may pursue different strategies that positively affect corporate 
performance.  Note that the “different strategies” interpretation of the 
findings of the meta-analysis suggests a strategic management role for 
boards.  It does not ascribe less risk taking to outsider-dominated boards 
though, as does the agency cost managerial-incentive theory153 described 
in the next Subsection. 
B.  Different Managerial Incentives 
The agency cost managerial-incentive theory has been offered to 
explain the advantages of insider-dominated boards,154 although it does 
not explain the advantages of outsider-dominated boards that were also 
found by the meta-analysis.  Like the different strategies explanation for 
the performance implications of board composition, this explanation 
focuses on the different informational sources of inside and outside 
directors.  But rather than informational differences that affect a board 
member’s preferences for strategies, these differences are claimed to 
affect a board’s method of evaluating managers, which in turn 
supposedly impacts the corporation by affecting the managers’ choices 
 
 152. Shaker A. Zahra, Governance, Ownership, and Corporate Entrepreneurship: 
The Moderating Impact of Industry Technological Opportunities, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
1713, 1729 (1996) (discussing outside directors who own large blocks of stock); see also 
Pearce & Zahra, supra note 111, at 420–21 (finding that boards with larger proportions 
of outside directors tend to pursue strategies of external growth and diversification).  The 
outside or inside director board classification scheme has been criticized for failing to 
capture the external or internal orientation of board members.  Using an attitudinal 
survey of directors of nine publicly held banks, the outsider or insider director 
classification did not reflect the external or internal orientation of board members.  See 
John A. Pearce II, The Relationship of Internal Versus External Orientations to 
Financial Measures of Strategic Performance, 4 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 297, 302–03 
(1983).  In addition, the study found a positive association between bank profitability 
and a high internal or low external orientation.  The definitions of internal and external 
orientation used in this study, however, are problematic.  The definitions, for example, 
bear no relationship to the manager-monitoring or relational roles of the board described 
in this Article and fail to capture the wide variety of functions that board members may 
perform.  Id. at 301–03. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 107–08. 
 154. Baysinger & Hoskisson, supra note 107, at 73–74; see supra text accompanying 
notes 107–08. 
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between more or less risky strategies.155  The argument is that outside 
directors are at a disadvantage relative to insiders in evaluating the CEO, 
that is, in discriminating between corporate financial outcomes that are 
the result of bad decisionmaking by the CEO and outcomes that are due 
to factors beyond the CEO’s control.  This explanation maintains that 
inside directors with firm-specific knowledge are better at evaluating the 
CEO and, therefore, they can enhance the CEO’s commitment and 
willingness to pursue risky strategies through investments and research 
and development.156   
In the terminology of this managerial-incentive theory, outside 
directors are said to rely on “outcome” or “financial” controls, whereas 
inside directors are claimed to rely on “behavioral” or “strategic” 
controls through observation of the actual behavior of the CEO.157  The 
managerial-incentive theory predicts that the choice of controls impacts 
strategic decisionmaking by the CEO by affecting his or her incentives.  
Outcome controls are claimed to shift the risk of poor results from 
shareholders to the CEO and cause the CEO to adopt more risk-averse 
strategies.  Thus, in corporations with more outside directors who are 
expected to utilize outcome controls, corporations are predicted to 
pursue more risk-averse strategies such as unrelated diversification and 
less expenditure on capital investments and research and development  
than if their boards were composed of more inside directors.  
Some studies have suggested that insider boards are more successful 
than outsider boards at supporting corporate risk taking activities.  One 
study of entrepreneurship activity found that corporations with more 
inside directors engaged in more entrepreneurial activities.158  Another 
study found a positive relationship between the percentage of inside 
directors on boards of Fortune 500 corporations and research and 
development spending.159  However, research and development spending 
may not reflect risk taking activities, but rather may reflect internal 
inefficiencies when corporations decide to keep funds rather than 
distribute them to shareholders.160  Moreover, without relating the 
entrepreneurial activities in the former study to corporate performance, it 
 
 155. Baysinger & Hoskisson, supra note 107, at 76–77, 80. 
 156. Id. at 80–81. 
 157. Id. at 78–79. 
 158. Zahra, supra note 152, at 1714–15 (including such activities as innovation, 
expansion of operations to enter new businesses, and strategic renewal in revitalizing the 
corporation’s operations by changing the scope of its business or competitive approach). 
 159. Barry D. Baysinger et al., Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on 
Corporate R&D Strategy, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 205, 205, 207 (1991). 
 160. Zahra, supra note 152, at 1715.  Research and development expenses may also 
serve a relational role by signaling to shareholders the corporation’s commitment to 
innovation.  Id. at 1717. 
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is difficult to judge whether these activities are advantageous to 
corporations.  One study of small and large airlines “found that both 
small and large airlines performed better to the degree that their 
competitive behaviors resembled those of the average, or typical, small 
and large airline.”161  This study suggests benefits to competitive 
conformity.  It may be that “small (or large) firms that are doing badly 
are inclined to engage in extreme, deviant behavior but that those 
performing well tend to engage in risk-averse conformist behavior.”162  
This explanation is consistent with prospect theory, which suggests that 
persons become more risk-seeking when faced with returns below 
target.163  More extreme strategic behaviors are observed by corporations 
that are in a downward spiral toward bankruptcy.164   
In a study of California general hospitals, the relationship between a 
board dominated by outside directors and the use of either outcome or 
behavioral controls was tested directly by surveying board members on 
their actual criteria for evaluating CEOs.165  This study found that boards 
consisting of higher percentages of outside directors were not associated 
with an emphasis on outcome controls.166  It also found mixed support 
for the relationship between outcome controls and risk-averse 
strategies.167  A negative relationship was found between the use of 
outcome controls and capital expenditures, but no relationship was found 
between outcome controls and unrelated diversification.168  
This study also found a negative relationship between the use of 
outcome controls for evaluating CEOs and both the frequency of board 
meetings and the existence of board-level strategic planning 
committees.169  Thus, interactions between CEOs and boards diminish 
the use of outcome controls.  The authors of this study explain: 
 
 161. Ming-Jer Chen & Donald C. Hambrick, Speed, Stealth, and Selective Attack: 
How Small Firms Differ from Large Firms in Competitive Behavior, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
453, 475 (1995). 
 162. Id. at 475–76. 
 163. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 
1104 (2000). 
 164. Donald C. Hambrick & Richard A. D’Aveni, Large Corporate Failures as 
Downward Spirals, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1988). 
 165. Rafik I. Beekun et al., Board Characteristics, Managerial Controls and 
Corporate Strategy: A Study of U.S. Hospitals, 24 J. MGMT. 3, 14–15 (1998). 
 166. Id. at 15. 
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. Id. at 15. 
 169. Id. at 16. 
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The results of this study suggest that board composition may not be the sole 
factor influencing the board’s access to information about the CEO’s 
performance-related behavior.  In fact, we showed that outsiders may have 
better access to information about the quality of the top manager’s decision 
making than suggested by the management [managerial-incentive] literature.  
Besides tighter board-CEO linkage through more frequent board meetings and 
the presence of a strategic planning committee, outsiders may successfully 
develop informal communication with “inside” management officials whose 
opinions they trust and respect.170 
This study suggests that, especially in corporations with outside directors, 
considerable attention should be given to the flow of information within 
the corporation and to the establishment of a board-level strategic 
planning committee.171  Note that a corporate ombudsperson would also 
improve the flow of information to outside directors. 
C.  Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups 
Although the heterogeneity and homogeneity group research has 
mainly focused on management teams rather than boards, it is suggested 
that the reason corporations with either insider- or outsider-dominated 
boards have higher ROAs is because these boards are more 
homogeneous than those consisting of more equal numbers of inside and 
outside directors.172  In fact, insider- and outsider-dominated boards are 
not more homogeneous and are unlikely to have the same degree of 
heterogeneity.  Moreover, homogeneous groups are not necessarily 
superior.173  As group theory has shown, heterogeneous groups tend to 
make higher quality decisions in matters involving creative and 
judgmental decisionmaking.174  Heterogeneous groups also have an 
advantage in solving problems having verifiably correct answers when 
“heterogeneity increases the probability of the group containing some 
members who are capable of determining the correct answer to the 
problems being solved”175 or when diversity increases “the amount of 
attention and discussion paid to each group member’s individual 
solution.”176  In regard to manager monitoring, “diversity ‘may promote 
the airing of different perspectives and reduce the probability of 
 
  170. Id. 
 171. Id.; see Daily & Schwenk, supra note 125, at 191 (noting that outside directors 
can easily acquire the information needed by “requesting this information” from top 
management team members, “regardless of their service on the board”). 
 172. Wagner et al., supra note 2. 
 173. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of homogeneous and 
heterogeneous groups, see Dallas, supra note 9, at 1388–1405. 
 174. Id. at 1392. 
 175. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 359. 
 176. John P. Wanous & Margaret A. Youtz, Solution Diversity and the Quality of 
Group Decisions, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 149, 157 (1986). 
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complacency and narrow-mindedness in a board’s evaluation of 
executive proposals.’”177  Such a board can produce a wider range of 
solutions for problems and decision criteria for evaluating corporate 
options.  Heterogeneity also mitigates various cognitive biases in 
decisionmaking.178  Thus, even if insider- and outsider-dominated boards 
were more homogeneous, this homogeneity would not necessarily 
explain better performance. 
D.  Conflicting Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards 
There is another interpretation of the findings of the meta-analysis:  
This interpretation recognizes that boards are expected to perform 
multiple roles, with the effective performance of these roles requiring 
different types of directors.  Some boards perform some roles better than 
others, depending on their composition.  An outsider-dominated board 
that consists of mainly independent directors may achieve a group 
dynamic necessary for effective manager monitoring.  Another kind of 
outsider-dominated board, composed of both independent and 
nonindependent outside directors, may more successfully assist the 
corporation in relating to its external environment.  An insider-
dominated board arguably may enable more insiders to communicate 
effectively with outside directors on the board, who provide advice and 
counsel.  The insider-dominated board may also reap the advantages of 
peer group decisionmaking when inside directors confer among 
themselves on strategic management issues. 
As previously noted, the manager-monitoring role of boards conflicts 
with the relational role of boards to the extent that the presence of inside 
and nonindependent outside directors on corporate boards prevents 
independent outside directors from objectively monitoring management.  
Although a structure that has important monitoring committees 
consisting of predominantly independent directors, such as the auditing, 
compensation, and nominating committees,179 may mitigate conformity 
pressures, a board dominated by independent directors is expected to be 
more successful at resisting these pressures.180  In addition, the manager-
monitoring role of boards conflicts with the strategic management role to the 
 
 177. Dallas, supra note 9, at 1400 (quoting Goodstein et al., supra note 146, at 243). 
 178. See id. at 1401–02. 
 179. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 180. Dallas, supra note 9, at 1400–01. 
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extent that the latter role requires that more inside directors serve on boards. 
If conflict exists between board roles, and if the advantages of 
different kinds of boards are better understood, it may be possible to 
modify the board’s structure to enhance the performance of multiple 
board roles.  For example, if insider boards engage in more strategic 
management and are more successful at these functions than outsider 
boards, it may be due to the benefits of group decisionmaking on issues 
involving some complexity and ambiguity.  That is, the main benefit of 
an insider board may be that it levels the hierarchy among executive 
officers by creating a more peer-like structure.  For example, consider 
the German two-tiered board structure, with a supervisory and 
management board.181  The two-tiered board structure permits collegial 
monitoring of management by the management board.  The management 
board of a German corporation usually consists of the corporation’s 
“top seven or so operating executives.”182  This flattening of the 
executive hierarchy means that the chairman of the management board 
in Germany is “the first among equals rather than the first among lessers 
usually associated with U.S. chief executive officers.”183  Of course, 
corporations can vary, with some having very strong chairmen.  
Nevertheless, this structure has a number of advantages.  The leveling of 
the hierarchy can result in greater accountability.  There is less of a 
chance that a dominant individual will become convinced of his 
invincibility.  As one observer notes: “The trouble with dominant figures 
is their increased propensity as time goes on to listen less, believe their 
own hyperbole, and as a consequence to make bad mistakes.”184  There 
are fewer instances of this occurring in German corporations than in 
U.S. corporations.185   
The danger of placing too much power in the hands of CEOs is 
confirmed by an Enron officer’s description of Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling: 
 
 181. See generally GOV’T COMM’N, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
(convenience trans., 2002) (presenting “essential statutory regulations for the 
management and supervision (governance) of German listed companies” and containing 
“internationally and nationally recognized standards for good and responsible 
governance”), available at http://www.muhlbauer.com (last modified Aug. 22, 2003); see 
also Russian Institute of Directors, Code of Best Practices for German Corporate 
Governance (2000) (discussing the German Stock Corporation Act), http://www.rid.ru/ 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 182. SPENCER STUART, EUROPEAN BOARD INDEX: CURRENT BOARD TRENDS AND 
PRACTICES AT MAJOR EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS 12 (1999); Steven N. Kaplan, Top 
Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 142, 
143 (1994). 
 183. Kaplan, supra note 182, at 147. 
 184. JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A STUDY OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 361 (1994). 
 185. Id. 
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Over the years, Jeff changed.  He became more of a creature of his own creation.  
His hubris came to outweigh some of the more attractive parts of his personality.  
He became more intolerant, more opinionated, more bombastic.  Jeff was always 
right, and that got worse.  He had a little bit of a God syndrome.186 
One knowledgeable observer of corporate practice notes that “a 
committee is actually a more efficient way of running a large and 
complex modern corporation than relying on a powerful and charismatic 
leader.”187  This is not only due to the cult of personality.  There is 
support for this view in psychological studies, which indicate that 
decisionmaking in ambiguous or uncertain situations is best made by 
groups rather than by individuals.188  Moreover, persons in more 
proximate social positions are more likely than those in disparate 
positions to bring disagreements and opposing perspectives into the open 
for discussion.189  Less political behavior can also be expected for a top 
management team in which members are also peers.190  A study of top 
management teams in the microcomputer industry found less evidence 
of politics in teams when power was not centralized in the CEO.191  
Politics is characterized by behind-the-scenes coalition formation, office 
lobbying, cooptative attempts, withholding information, and the 
controlling of agendas.192  Thus, the advantages of insider-dominated 
boards found by the meta-analysis may reflect the advantages of group 
decisionmaking on strategic management issues by executive officers 
serving in proximate social positions on these boards. 
A restructuring proposal that is consistent with this Article’s 
interpretation of the meta-analysis on the multiple roles of corporate 
boards and that takes advantage of group decisionmaking among top 
corporate officers is the dual board structure.  This structure consists of a 
manager-monitoring board composed only of independent directors, the 
conflicts board, and a relational board consisting of a mix of different 
 
 186. Evan Thomas et al., Every Man for Himself, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 2002, at 22. 
 187. CHARKHAM, supra note 184, at 361. 
 188. DON HELLRIEGEL ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 228–30 (3d ed. 1983); 
Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate 
Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1982). 
 189. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt & L.J. Bourgeois III, Politics of Strategic Decision 
Making in High-Velocity Environments: Toward A Midrange Theory, 31 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 737, 749–53, 763–65 (1988). 
 190. Id. at 756–59. 
 191. Id. at 743. 
 192. Id. at 737–38. 
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types of directors—the business review board.193  The business review 
board would perform various relational and strategic management 
functions, and some monitoring functions, and would be composed of a 
mix of inside directors and relational outside directors.  This board 
would have the advantages of group decisionmaking among top 
executives, but would also perform important relational functions and 
some monitoring functions through the presence of relational outside 
directors.  The conflicts board would have group dynamics more 
consistent with objective manager monitoring by being composed solely 
of independent outside directors.  Attention should also be given to the 
flow of information to these independent directors.  The appointment by 
independent directors of a corporate ombudsperson, who would have 
access to all meetings and information concerning the corporation and 
would report to these directors, would enhance the directors’ ability to 
engage in effective manager monitoring.194  The formation of board-
level strategic planning committees would also facilitate important 
communication between outside directors and management. 
The dual board structure would have the effect of allowing boards to 
perform potentially conflicting functions through persons best able to 
perform each function.  As the corporation has created divisions and 
departments to specialize in the many tasks required of it as its 
operations have become more complex, so must the board of directors 
give attention to the many roles it is expected to perform and to the 
characteristics of persons best suited to perform those functions.  The 
dual board structure also draws on the benefits of group decisionmaking.  
In ambiguous and uncertain situations, group decisionmaking can prove 
beneficial.  This insight also provides support for restructuring the U.S. 
system to provide for employee directors who would further enhance the 
manager-monitoring and relational functions of corporate boards by, 
among other things, bringing diverse perspectives and information to the 
attention of boards.195 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored developments in board structure, 
composition, and practices that are designed to improve the manager-
monitoring capability of corporate boards of directors.  These 
developments have included an increase in the percentage of outside 
directors on corporate boards and board committees.  In addition, board 
 
 193. Dallas, supra note 4, at 114. 
 194. Id. at 130–36. 
 195. See Dallas, supra note 9, at 1407. 
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committees have been formed to specialize in areas where managerial 
oversight is particularly important.  Attention has also been given to 
decreasing the role of the CEO in the appointment of board chairpersons 
and committee members.  These functions are increasingly being 
performed by full boards or by corporate governance committees.  Board 
practices have also developed to enhance the objectivity and 
effectiveness of boards.  Outside directors often meet separately from 
the full boards, and boards have put in place methods for reviewing the 
performances of the full board and individual board members.  Few 
corporations have adopted other proposals for improving the performance 
of their boards; such proposals include appointing a lead director or 
chairperson who is an independent director, limiting the number of 
directorships that board members may simultaneously fill, and forming 
management succession committees despite substantial criticism of the 
management succession process by many directors.  Perhaps more 
important, too little attention has been given to whether the outside 
directors are truly independent of management, as the Enron debacle has 
demonstrated.  In addition to the manager-monitoring role of boards, this 
Article also discussed the relational role of boards.  Corporations relate 
to their shareholders through the presence of shareholder representatives 
on their boards.  In addition, a portion of board memberships is held by 
various persons who assist corporations in relating to their 
nonshareholder stakeholders.  More recently, the diversity movement on 
corporate boards has exemplified the importance of the relational 
functions of corporate boards.  Diverse directors are intended to relate 
corporations to their consumers and employees, both domestic and 
foreign.  Diversity also has an additional benefit in uncertain and 
ambiguous environments in which diverse perspectives have the 
potential to improve the quality of decisionmaking.  These reasons also 
support the giving of additional attention to providing employee 
representation on corporate boards. 
Finally, boards also perform functions relating to corporate strategy.  
This Article has delineated the various strategy-related functions that 
boards may perform.  Although most of these functions are subsumed 
within the manager-monitoring and relational roles of corporate boards, 
a third role, which this Article refers to as strategic management, may be 
emerging.  Strategic management functions are usually performed by 
management, and there are good reasons for this allocation of functions.  
There are advantages to peer group decisionmaking on strategic 
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management subjects that suggest advantages to the restructuring of 
boards to provide for a business review board in a dual board system. 
Considerable theoretical and empirical literature supports the 
importance of outside directors to the board’s performance of relational 
and manager-monitoring functions.  A recent meta-analysis of board 
studies finds that both insider- and outsider-dominated boards are 
associated with corporations with higher ROAs.  These findings may 
indicate that both insider- and outsider-dominated boards have 
advantages that offset their disadvantages.  The potential for improving 
board effectiveness lies in maximizing the advantages of both kinds of 
boards through a dual board structure.  As previously explained, the 
structure proposed in this Article is not the German two-tiered board 
structure, but a structure that is specially suited to the performance of the 
multiple roles of corporate boards.  The dual board consists of a conflicts 
board, composed solely of independent directors, and a business review 
board, consisting of a mix of different types of directors who need not be 
independent.   
Without attention to board structure, the multiple roles of boards will 
conflict because the persons ideally suited to perform some board 
functions are not ideally suited to perform others.  In addition to the dual 
board structure, this Article recommends the appointment of corporate 
ombudspersons by independent directors and the formation of strategic 
management committees to improve the flow of information to outside 
directors.  Also recommended are employee directors who have 
incentives to protect their stakes in the corporations and who are able to 
provide diverse perspectives and information to improve the quality of 
board decisionmaking.  As corporate organizations change to accommodate 
the needs of a more complex, changing environment, so must the 
structure, composition, and practices of corporate boards. 
 
